


Gender Socialization:

How Bargaining Power Shapes
Social Norms and Political
Attitudes

Efficiency, Bargaining, and Patriarchy

- The efficiency of household sexual division of labor varies by economic system of production.
- High levels of household division of labor weaken women's bargaining power in the family by reducing her outside options.
- Patriarchy, or general the subordination of women in the private and public spheres, is the result of weak female bargaining power.



Modes of Production and Intra-Family Bargaining

- Women in hunter gatherer societies could survive on their own, giving women outside options to “marriage.”
 - Scholarly opinion differs as to the importance of male-supplied protein to female and child survival, but females supplied $\frac{3}{4}$ of the community’s caloric intake.
 - Female economic viability removes the logic of hard wired desire for males with resources.

Agrarian Economies and Patriarchy


- The premium on male brawn in agricultural production and protection increased the efficient level of household division of labor.
- Females' lost role in food production made her less viable outside the marriage.
- Patriarchal values are strongest when families raise their daughters to play the marriage market.


Industrialization

- Labor saving devices in food and material production created a demand for female labor outside the home.
- Outside options to marriage gave females bargaining power in the home.
- Female bargaining power undermines patriarchal values by altering families' strategies for socializing their daughters.

Service Sector Economies

- Demand for female labor further expands in service sector economies because of the proliferation of general skills jobs that do not penalize career interruption.
- We expect value change to accelerate in service economies, with the increase in female labor force participation.






		Demand for non-manual labor	
		Low	High
Demand for hard physical labor (“brawn”) and household-specific skills	Low	Hunter-gatherer: High equality between the sexes ($P \approx 1/2$)	Postindustrial society: High equality in bargaining power ($P \approx 1/2$). Modest division of labor, and equitable gender norms
	High	Agricultural society: Male dominance (high P). Sharp division of labor, and patriarchal norms	Industrial society: Sharp division of labor, but emerging opportunities for women outside the family (intermediate P)

Bargaining Power and Mate Selection


- We expect mate preferences to change with female labor force participation
 - As females gain stronger bargaining power, males have weaker expectations of a strict sexual division of labor.
 - The importance of a virgin bride diminishes as families place less pressure on their daughters to play to the marriage market.



Female Labor Force Participation and Political Preferences

- All else equal, females prefer government policies, such as child care and other services, that enable them to supply their labor.
In specific skills economies, the public sector is a crucial source of female employment that enables women to maintain outside options.

Figure 2



Revisiting Some Claims in the Literature

- Orloff (1993, 1999) and co-authors predict the sharpest gender conflicts in countries where females are most disadvantaged.
- We expect, by contrast, the gender preference gap to be *lower* in countries where females labor market participation is stunted, because females are voting with their husbands' pocket books.

Public-Private Sector in Scandinavia

- Pierson (2000) argues that because Scandinavian men in the private sector tend to be married to women in the public sector, the disputes over wage differentials will be muted.
- Relaxing the assumption that the family is a single utility maximizing unit shows why this conclusion does not follow.

Gender Gap on Trade

- Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) suggest that the gender gap on trade will attenuate as females gain more economic literacy.
- We think it is more likely that the gender gap on trade reflects the fact that more females are employed in the public sector, and therefore have a greater fear of government downsizing.

Conclusions

- Patriarchal norms are stable, through the internalization of social values, when it is economically inefficient for females to provide for their own livelihood.
- Mate preferences become more equal with equality of economic opportunity.
- The gender gap in political preferences reflects an attempt to make opportunities more equal still.